among them, which I cannot explain in our french, except by circumlocutions.

Second, they have some Verbs which I call absolute, to which neither the Greeks, nor Latins, nor we ourselves, nor any language of Europe with which I am familiar, have anything similar. For example, the verb *Nimitison* means absolutely, "I eat," without saying what; for, if you determine the [176] thing you eat, you have to use another Verb.

Third, they have different Verbs to signify an action toward an animate or toward an inanimate object; and yet they join with animate things a number of things that have no souls, as tobacco, apples, etc. Let us give some examples: "I see a man," Niouapaman iriniou; "I see a stone," niouabatē; but in Greek, in Latin, and in French the same Verb is used to express, "I see a man, a stone, or anything else." "I strike a dog," ni noutinau attimou; "I strike wood," ninoutinen misticou. This is not all; for, if the action terminates on several animate objects, another Verb has to be used,—"I see some men," niouapamaoueth irinioueth, ninoutinaoueth attimoueth, and so on with all the others.

In the fourth place, they have Verbs suitable to express an action which terminates on the person reciprocal, and others still which terminate on the things that belong to him; and we cannot use these Verbs, referring to other persons not reciprocal, without speaking improperly. I will explain myself. The Verb [177] nitaouin means, "I make use of something;" nitaouin agouniscouchon, "I am using a hat;" but when I come to say, "I am using his hat," that is, the hat of the man of whom I speak, we must change the verb and say, Nitaouiouan outagoumiscou-